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1. Historical Prelude 
Tracking theories1 of knowledge, though quite popular 
have been under attack from their inception. Specifically, 
we have in mind the attacks of Saul Kripke.2 We don’t think 
these attacks on tracking theories work. In this paper, we 
take a step towards rescuing Nozick’s version of the 
tracking theories of knowledge from the attacks of Kripke.  
2. The Kripke Examples3 
The Red Barn  
Peg is looking at a red barn. Red barns cannot be faked 
though barns of other color can be faked. Peg has perfect 
eyesight and is observing the barn under standard lighted 
viewing conditions. According to Nozick’s conditions, Peg 
knows there is a red barn, but Kripke claims that it is a 
consequence of Nozick’s theory that Peg does not know 
there is a barn. Peg does not know there is a barn be-
cause she fails’ Nozick’s tracking condition that if there 
were not a barn, Peg would not believe there were. She 
would believe of a white fake barn that it was a barn.  
Nozick is very clear that his tracking conditions must be 
relativized to methods. For example, otherwise only God 
could satisfy the condition that if p were true, one would 
believe it. When we specify the method of belief formation 
that yields Peg’s knowledge that there is a red barn, we 
see that the same method yields her knowledge that there 
is a barn. 
Let’s look at a related example.4 Suppose Pam never 
confuses Volkswagen Beetles with Saabs. However, Pam 
thinks Saabs are the luxury version of the Volkswagen and 
that Beetles are the economy version. When Pam sees a 
Beetle under ideal viewing conditions she knows that it is a 
Volkswagen Beetle. Her method of knowing is to look at 
the shape and size of the Volkswagen Beetle. The visual 
experience of the shape and size of the Beetle carries the 
information both that the car is a Beetle and that it is a 
Volkswagen. Not only does she know that it is a Beetle, 
but she also knows that it is a Volkswagen. Pam satisfies 
Nozick’s tracking condition that if it were not a Beetle and 
she used the VW-Beetle method, she would not believe 
that it was a Beetle. It is also true that if it were not a 
Volkswagen and she used the VW-Beetle method, she 
would not believe it was a Volkswagen.5 So contrary to 
Kripke, we maintain that this is a case where Pam knows 
both that it is a Beetle and that it is a Volkswagen because 
she is using the same reliable method to detect both.  
                                                     
1 We include among the tracking theorists Armstrong (1973), Dretske (1971, 
1981) and Nozick (1981), but we will focus only on Nozick here.  
2 Why just this attack? Without doubt it has been the most influential and is 
widely believed to succeed in defeating the tracking theories. 
3 Kripke gave these examples at a session of the APA in the 1980s, but the 
paper was never published. It has been widely circulated and almost everyone 
we meet thinks the examples work, but they do not work – as we shall now 
begin to show for a subset of them. 
4 This example was based on one by Goldman and appeared in Dretske’s 
(1975) review of Armstrong. 
5 It is true that if she used the “looks like a Saab” method, she might believe a 
non-Volkswagen to be a Volkswagen. But this is irrelevant to whether she 
knows it is a Volkswagen when using the VW-Beetle method. 
Returning to the red barn example, since Peg is using 
the reddish barnish look to form the belief that there is a 
red barn, she satisfies Nozick’s tracking condition that it if 
there were not a red barn, she would not believe there 
were. And if there were not a red barn present and peg 
were to believe there were a barn, she would not be using 
the same red barn look method. This leads us to believe 
that when Peg believes there is a red barn, she believes 
there is a barn in part employing the red barn method. This 
method insures that Peg knows of this structure that it is 
both red and a barn. Hence, Peg indeed does know of the 
red barn that it is a barn, contrary to Kripke’s claim. Essen-
tially, Kripke’s example only appears to be problematic if 
one violates Nozick’s strictures on method.  
Someone may object that we slicing methods too thinly 
or without principle merely to rescue Nozick. Maybe there 
will be some sympathy for the notion of a VW-Beetle 
method of belief formation, but we suspect people will balk 
at the notion of a red-barn method of belief formation. Our 
reply is that in the wild, even the Stickleback fish has to 
solve the red dot detection method of rivals during mating 
season. If fish can solve this epistemic detection problem, 
yielding knowledge of their rivals, then surely we can solve 
it and there are real live models of this abstract method of 
knowing. 
The Deceased Dictator 
The strongman dictator of a totalitarian country dies. The 
state-run newspaper prints that the dictator is dead (p). 
Later, fearing a coup, the newspaper prints a retraction 
saying that there was a mistake. They show pictures of the 
dictator alive and well. Ken returns from a long trip out of 
the country. He reads the first newspaper, but then goes to 
sleep due to jetlag. The rest of the country read and be-
lieves the retraction. Ken, like others, would believe the 
retraction, if he were to read the second newspaper. So 
while Ken sleeps he loses his knowledge that the dictator 
is dead because he fails Nozick’s condition that if the 
dictator were dead, Ken would believe it. Ken would not 
believe it, if he read the retraction6. 
Kripke’s modification of this original example by Harman 
is to add the proposition (q) that “I have read an uncontra-
dicted report of the dictator’s death.” Kripke maintains that 
on Nozick’s conditions Ken knows p&q but not p (as we’ve 
seen above, Ken fails to know p). Supposedly, Ken knows 
p&q because his belief that p&q does satisfy the condition 
that if p&q, Ken would believe p&q. This is true because 
for Ken to believe that he had read an uncontradicted 
report of the dictator’s death, he would have to have read 
an uncontradicted report. So Ken would have not to have 
read the second newspaper (keeping q true). 
In reply, this example fails because Ken knows neither p 
nor p&q, on Nozick’s own conditions. Ken will either be 
savvy and not believe something merely because it ap-
pears in the state controlled newspaper or gullible, and he 
will believe everything that appears there. So suppose Ken 
is savvy. Then Ken does not know p&q, because he fails 
                                                     
6 This example turns on Nozick’s fourth condition only. So we will focus atten-
tion on that condition in presenting the example. 




the fourth condition. It is not true of Ken that if p&q then he 
would believe it. A savvy Ken rejects many things that he 
reads in the state run newspaper. So, suppose that Ken is 
gullible. Then he believes everything that appears in the 
state run newspaper. In that case Ken fails condition three, 
viz. that if p&q were not true, Ken would not believe p&q. A 
gullible Ken believes falsehoods that are printed in the 
newspaper. In that case, Ken cannot (without independent 
confirmation) learn anything from a state run newspaper 
that is highly unreliable. So on Nozick’s own conditions, 
the dictator example is not a case where Ken knows p&q 
but does not know p (as intended by Kripke). 
For good measure, we will discuss one more of Kripke’s 
purported counterexamples to tracking theories. We will 
not attempt to exhaustively cover them here, but we 
maintain that each fails. We hope to have demonstrated 
that we could go on and demonstrate the ineffectiveness 
of the rest. 
The Sloppy Scientist 
Steve is looking for a cure for a particular disease. Steve 
selects a drug D for several trials of treatment. The trials 
are effective in curing the disease and Steve comes to 
believe that drug D will cure this disease (p). Unfortunately, 
Steve is a sloppy scientist. He forgets to run a control 
using a placebo. As it turns out, had he used the controls, 
the placebos would have been negative. 
Kripke maintains that this is a counterexample to Nozick 
because it satisfies Nozick’s conditions for knowing, but 
that Steve does not know that p. Steve does not know 
because Steve’s procedure is irrational. Steve is ignoring 
standard control procedures for sound experimental de-
sign. Despite this, Steve satisfies Nozick’s tracking condi-
tions. Specifically, if p were not true Steve would not be-
lieve that p, and if p were true, Steve would believe that p 
(given his sloppiness). 
Kripke’s example is exploiting the intuition that one can-
not learn something from an unreliable method or proce-
dure: due to sloppiness, Steve’s experimental procedure is 
unreliable. Kripke is also suggesting that Steve’s proce-
dure is somewhat irrational and that one cannot know 
something if one is being somewhat irrational. This latter 
claim concerning irrationality is reminiscent of Bonjour’s 
attack on externalist theories, which we also reject in a 
longer paper. Here we will focus our comments on the 
suggestion that Steve does not know that p because 
Steve’s procedure is unreliable because Steve is sloppy. 
We maintain that being sloppy does not preclude latching 
onto knowledge or a reliable method. 
There are at least two kinds of sloppiness. One kind 
would exist if Steve were sloppy in screening patients for 
the disease or in the experimental set up where he ad-
ministered the drug. Call this primary process sloppiness. 
If Steve didn’t control for variables and background condi-
tions in the administering of the drug itself, then we would 
agree that Steve does not know that p. But in this kind of 
case, the sloppiness would cause Steve to fail Nozick’s 
conditions. There could be false positives or false nega-
tives in the administering of drug D and collecting the 
results. In Kripke’s example, Steve was not sloppy in this 
primary way.  
Another kind of sloppiness is secondary process sloppi-
ness. Here Steve fails to provide an independent check on 
his results. We see this as a failure of confirmation not of 
information. Steve is at fault for not attempting to verify his 
information. His primary process procedure of administer-
ing the drug and controlling for variables, is impeccable. 
He is sloppy in his neglect of secondary process controls. 
We maintain that, perhaps surprisingly, Steve does know 
that p because he satisfies Nozick’s tracking conditions. 
Steve does receive the information that drug D cures the 
disease. What he does not do is gather sound confirmation 
that he has received that very information. 
We suspect that dissenters will say that scientific knowl-
edge only comes into existence after the secondary proc-
ess controls are in place. Isn’t that what double blind ex-
periments are all about? But we maintain that this is what 
confirmation is all about. It is part and parcel of attempting 
to confirm a hypothesis that says that a particular theory or 
claim is true. In cross-examining a witness, prior to the 
cross-examination, a witness may be telling the truth and 
be perfectly reliable. The jury won’t know that or suspect it 
until after the cross-examination, but this does not mean 
that the witness was not reliable until after the cross-ex-
amination.  
3. Conclusion  
This concludes our brief survey of what we take to be the 
best of the attempts to kill off the tracking theories of 
knowledge. We maintain that none of them succeed. We 
maintain that the tracking theories remain viable accounts 
of knowledge.  
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